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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NICKERSON PUMP AND
MACHINERY CO., INC.,
Petition.er,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9353

THE STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties herein will be designated as follows: Petitioner, Nickerson Pump and J.\!Iachinery Co., Inc., as
''Nickerson'' and Respondent, State Tax Commission of
Utah, as the ''Tax Commission.'' Emphasis has been
supplied.
This is a proceeding to review an order and decision
of the Tax Commission imposing a sales tax liability and
deficiency upon Nickerson. The assessment was based
1
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upon a series of transactions wherein the petitioner sold
and emplaced water pumps to governmental units under
lump-sum contracts, the governmental units being exempt
from sales tax liability. The issue presented, as suggested by the petitioner, is whether plaintiff is the consumer
of water pump assemblies sold and emplaced by it under
lump-sum contracts, it apparently being conceded that if
Nickerson is found to be the consumer of the pump assemblies in question it is subject to sales or use tax as assessed
by the State Tax Commission.
It is submitted that to find Nickerson a consumer
does not require modification of previous decisions as
intimated by petitioner, but rather that previous decisions
relied upon by the petitioner have already been severely
qustioned by this Court. It is stipulated and conceded
that the penalties mentioned in petitioner's Point II were
improperly assessed and that its Point III is valid.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees substantially with the statement
of facts as set forth by the petitioner. In addition thereto,
the following facts are submitted:
The pumps in question are specifically engineered
for the particular need involved. An engineering firm is
often consulted to determine the requirement of the water
and the size of the pump which is needed in a particular
case, and a complete set of specifications are furnished to
the petitioner, which then supplies a pump and related
equipment for the given need. (T. R. pg. 79)
2
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The following items are included in the lump-sum
contract, and petitioner is required to furnish:

1. a motor and pump head
2. a discharge column assembly
3. a suction pipe and strainer
4. a water level indicator
5. labor
(Commission's Exhibit 16 and 17.) These exhibits are
typical of what is bid upon by petitioner, in that they
list the specifications, the type of equipment and the basis
for payment which go into a lump-sum bid of the nature
involved herein. ( T. R. p. 73)
In addition, the Tax Commission found the installation of deep well pumps under lump-sum contracts
made by the taxpayer with tax-exempt organizations on
property of said organizations to be an installation by
an ultimate consumer of materials and supplies for the
purpose of erecting, building on or otherwise improving,
altering or repairing the real property of others.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PETITIONER, NICKERSON PUMP AND MACHINERY CO., IS A CONSUMER.
The question is fundamentally as stated by the petitioner on page 13 of its brief. If the petitioner in the
3
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sale and emplacement of pumps and pumping equipment
under a lump-sum contract is the consumer, it should pay
the tax on materials being consumed. In other words, the
question is whether or not petitioner consumes the pump,
motor and related equipment necessary to fill its lumpsum contract and to deliver an operating unit installed
in the ground. In this regard there can be no question
but that Nickerson is a consumer.
The petitioner contends that assembling pumps from
component parts is "manufacturing" or "compounding
for sale,'' and, further contends that manufacturing is
not taxable as consumption. Error is committed here.
Section 59-16-4 (h), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, does not
exempt property consumed by a manufacturer as the last
user. See Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 135, 170 P. 2d 164 (1946). Therefore,
even if Nickerson were a manufacturer, only the property
which entered into and became an ingredient or component part of the property manufactured which was thus
passed on to an ultintate user would be thereby exempt.
The test is, ''Are the articles involved consumed by the
processor as the last user~ If they are so consumed the
tax must be paid thereon by the processor." E. C. Olsen
Co. v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 168 P. 2d
324 (1946).
Petitioner claims it is exempt from the tax in question because it manufactures or compounds for sale, but
the test for the manufacturing exemption is whether or
not the articles involved are consumed. Hence, petitioner

4
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begs the question
exemption.

by claiming the

manufacturing

Petitioner further contends that under the terms of
Tax Commission Regulation 58, where the contractor enters into both lump-sum contracts and agreements to furnish materials and supplies at a fixed price and to render
~l'l'\'ire for an additional price that he is deemed to be
a retailer of tangible personal property and that the
Commission should be bound by this determination. The
Regulation provides that :
"In case a contractor enters into both of the
above kinds of contracts, he shall be deemed to be
a retailer of tangible personal property and shall
register with the State Tax Commission, obtain a
sales tax license, purchase all materials for resale
;and report his liability direct to the State Tax
Commission.'' (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner suggests that this has been done and, therefore,
that it is a retailer of tangible personal property. It is
significant that Regulation 58 further provides:

"Contra.ctors or repairmen in, no case should give
a resale certificate when they purchase materials,
supplies, equipment or other a.rticles for their own
use and consumption."
The plain import of Regulation 58 is to require contractors entering into both of the above kinds of contracts
to obtain a sales tax license in order to properly collect
tax and report their liability and pay sales tax on retail
sales. The quoted parts of Regulation 58 are in no way
designed to abrogate the lump-sum provisions of the
5
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Regulation concerning contracts by contractors wherein
the sale of materials and supplies is taxable to the contractor where he becomes the consumer or the final buyer.
Taxpayer, in the present case, contends that it does
not consume pumps ; that the buyers from it do consume them, and that the pump assemblies retain their
identity after being installed under a lump-sum contract.
The Tax Commission respectfully takes issue with these
contentions. In particular Nickerson Pump and Machinery Co. did act as a consumer of purchases specified in
Schedules 2 and 4 of the original deficiency assessment.
Petitioner claims not to be a consumer, user or storer of
the purchases involved and bases this claim upon a strict
definition of the word "consumed." However, this as
defined in the case of Utah Concrete Products Corp. v.
State Taa; Commission, 101 Ut. 513, 125 P. 2d 408 (1942),
has been given a liberal construction. The court in that
case said:
"From the context of our statute 'used' and 'consumed' may be said to express the same meaning
- to make use of, to employ and does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction or extermination or change in form of the article or commodity."
It is not disputed that the transactions which resulted in
an assessment by the State Tax Commission were those
upon which the taxpayer bid and sold pumps, motors and
related equipment under lump-sum contracts.
"Sales to contractors are sales to consumers * * * "
State v. J. WaUs Kearn.ey & Sons, 181 La. 554, 160 So. 78
6
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(1934). See also Volk v. Evatt, 142 Ohio 335, 52 N.E. 2d
338 (1943).
''A contractor when fabricating personalty into
realty neither sells, resells, sells at retail, nor can he be
considered a retailer.'' Duha;me v. State Ta.x Commission.,
65 Ariz. 268, 179 P. 2d 252, 171 ALR 684 (1947).
According to the Utah Supreme Court the words
''used'' and ''consumed'' are synonymous. To construe
either word to mean that the state may only tax the sale
of property which is consumed or destroyed in use is to
virtually annihilate the Act and give it a strained and
unthought of meaning. Such a construction would immediately exclude diamond rings, luxuries and other things
not destroyed or consumed immediately in use, from the
realm of liability for sales and use taxes. It is suggested
that this intention cannot be attributed to the legislature.
However, even under the narrow definition as contended
by taxpayer, the personal property used by the contractor
was consumed and used under lump-sum contracts.
In addition to defining ''consume'' to mean ''to destroy," "to use up" and "to expend," Webster's New
International Dictionary gives the following definitions:
''Consumer n. 1. One that consumes. 2. Economics. One who uses (economic) goods and so
diminishes or destroys their utility; opposed to
producer.''
''Consumption * * * 2. Economics. The use of
(economic) goods resulting in the diminution or
destruction of their utility; - opposed to production. Consumption may consist in the active use
of goods in such a manner as to accomplish their

7
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direct and immediate destruction, as in eating food,
wearing clothes, or burning fuel; or it may consist
in the mere keeping, and enjoying the presence or
prospect of, a thing, which is destroyed only by
the gradual processes of natural decay, as in the
maintenance of a picture gallery.''
''Generally, it may be said that consumption means
using things, and production means adapting them for
use." See J. W. Meadors & Co. v. State, 89 Ga. App. 583,
80 S.E. 2d 86 (1954).
The problem of what is meant by "consume" was
presented to the Colorado Supreme Court under a statute
providing that a ''retail sale'' includes all sales made
within the state except wholesale sales, and that ''wholesale sale'' means a sale by wholesalers to retail merchants,
jobbers, dealers, or other wholesalers for resale and does
not include a sale to "users or consumers, not for resale."
It was held, in Craftsmen Painters & Decorators v. Carpen>ter, 111 Colo. 1, 137 P. 2d 414 (1942), that an administrative regulation in effect declaring that building
contractors were users or consumers of materials and
supplies used by them in performing building contracts
was valid. And it was held that painting contractors were
the users of paints, oils, finishes, and other incidental
materials used by them in the business of painting contractors, and that electrical contractors were the users
and consumers of wire, lighting :fixtures, and incidental
materials used in the business of electrical contracting.
The court said :
"The problem presented to the director of revenue, briefly stated, was, Were plaintiffs the ulti8
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mate users and consumers of the materials built
into their jobs and furnished the owner as an entirety, or were they retailers to those owners ?f
each particular item of personal property so bu1lt
in'? Stated otherwise, Were they selling to the
owner the completed job, or were they selling him
separately each pint of paint and each piece of
wire used in the job~ We think his conclusion that
when they purchased the several items of personal
property and built them into the structure as an
integral part of their entire contract, and then disposed of the completed work to the owner, they
were users and consumers and not retailers to the
owner of each item, was not only a ruling within
his discretion, but is absolutely irrefutable on any
basis of logical reasoning, and that authority to
support it is no more essential than is authority to
support the conclusion that black is not white, or
that two plus two equals four." See Note 163
A.L.R. p. 282.

It is urged that Nickerson can be nothing but a consumer under applicable statutes and judicial interpretations.
Petitioner further contends that the pumps, motors
and related equipment which are the subject matter of this
deficiency assessment are no less pumps and related
equipment after emplacement than before, and contends that because of this fact petitioner is not a consumer. It becomes necessary to determine what is meant
by a product losing its identity or being incorporated into
a separate entity. In the Utah Concrete Products case,
Supra, the Utah Supreme Court cites approvingly the
case of City of St. Louis v. Smith, 342 Mo. 317, 114 S.W.
~d 1017 (1938), where under Retail Sales Statutes the
9
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contractors in question were held liable for the tax as
''consumers'' and it was found to be the dealer's duty to
collect the tax at the time of sale. The court there said:
"It is clear from these statutory provisions that
where one buys tangible personal property for his
own use or consumption he is liable for the tax.
On the other hand, it is equally clear that where
one buys tangible personal property for the purpose of resale he is not liable for the tax. In this
case, the contractors agreed with the city to furnish all the labor and material neceessary to construct, and to construct the improvement in question for a fixed sum of money. It was necessary
for the contractor to purchase and use all material
necessary to complete said work in order to be in
a position to deliver to the city a completed structure a.s provided in the contract. Our judgment is
that it cannot be said by the contractor that he resold the materials to the city for its use, and then
not use or consume them in the performance of his
contract. We are not without authority on this
question. In the case of State v. Christhilf, 170 Md.
586, 185 Atl. 456, 458 (1936), that court said: 'It is
the contractor or builder who is the ultimate user
or consumer of the materials which in one of these
cases are converted and fabricated into a building
and in the other into a road.'
''Another authority, State v. J. Watts Kearney &
Sons, 181 La. 554, 160 So. 77 (1954), is to the same
effect. Speaking of sales of materials to contractors, that court said : 'His undertaking is to
deliver to his obligee some work or edifice or
structure, the construction of which requires the
application of skill and labor to these materials
so that, when he finishes his task, the materials
purchased are no longer to be distinguished but
something has been wrought from their use and
10
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union. The contractor has not resold, but has
consumed the materials. Sales to contractors are
sales to consumers.'
"Again, the case of York Heating & Ventilating
Co. v. Flannary, 87 Pa. Suer. 19 (1936), that court
said of the installation of a blower and heating
system by contract: 'The contract in suit in no
sense was a contract of sale. It was a construction
contract. * * * It would be just as proper to call
a contract for the construction of a building, a
sale of the stone, brick, cement, wood, etc., which
entered into the erection of the building'
"In our judgment the contractors in this case did
not buy the materials in question, for the purpose
of reselling such materials to the city. They were
under contract to deliver to the city the finished
product. It was the in-separable comingling of
labor and material that produced the finished
product. Our conclusion is that the contractors
used and consumed the material in order to produce the finished product in compliance with their
contract." (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of .Atlas Supply Co. v. Maxwell, 212 N.C.
624, 194 S.E. 117 (1957), the court on holding plumbing
and heating contractors subject to sales tax law stated
that:
''They purchase the materials and supplies, not
for resale as tangible personal property, but for
use in producing the turnkey job. There is no
resale of the materials and supplies as such, either
actual or intended, within the meaning of the act."
See views expressed to the same effect in Lone Star C ement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 234 Ala. 465, 175 So.
399 (1937) ; .Albuquerque Lumber Co. v. Bureau of Rev11
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enue, 42 N.M. 58, 75 P. 2d 334 (1938) ; Sta.te v. J. Watts
Kearny & Sons, 181 La. 554, 160 So. 77 (1934); Herlihy
Mid-ConUnent Co. v. Nudelma;n., 367 TIL 60, 12 N.E. 2d
638, 115 A.L.R. 491 (1938). All of which cases were cited
in the Utah Concrete Products case at page 519.
It is submitted that an article of tangible personal
property sold under a lump-sum construction contract to
install the same thereby loses its identity in that what is
finally sold is not personal property but is rather that
article plus any other articles combined with the labor
necessary to meet specifications under the lump-sum contract. This was considered in the case of Harding v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 275 P. 2d 264 (1954), where it was
held that the taxpayer did not sell a specific amount of
cement, tile, lumber, etc., but rather he contracted to and
did construct an airplane hangar, and if there was any
contract of sale at all it was for the sale of a completed
hangar and not for the various component parts thereof.
It is apparent that petitioner in this case is a consumer because it was the last person to deal with the
products which it sold before they lost their identity as
such and became incorporated into a separate entity.

CONCLUSION
The petitioner did act as a consumer of articles in
filling its lump-sum contracts with various governmental
units.
12
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The decision of the Tax Commission should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General
F. BURTON HOWARD,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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